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THE REQUISITIONED AND THE GOVERNMENT-
OWNED SHIP 
JURISDICTION IN TH~ COURTS OF GMAT BRITAIN, FRANC~, 
AND TH~ UNIT~D STAT~ 
J URISDICTION over requisitioned and government-owned mer-chantmen and thejr liabilities under maritime laws are 
questions which present no real novelty. They were regarded by 
the ancient sea-law and were as familiar to it as they have recently 
become, 'On account of the exigencies of the late war, to the admi-
ralty systems of to-day. The maritime law of Rome supplies mod-
ern cases with the most cogent parallels and is reflected today in 
the jurisprudence of France and other continental and Latin coun-
tries. The jurisdictional question which figures most prominently 
in these cases relates to the authority to arrest or libel the property 
of a foreign sovereign. It is stili in the controversial state in the 
United States. In France, administrative law has dealt with the 
question in a manner both practical and consistent with the best 
principles of jurispntdence. In British law, public use, as distin-
guished from the possession of the government, affords immunity 
from arrest to the requisitioned or publicly owned merchant vessel 
of a foreign sovereign. 
The subject of the government-owned and requisitioned ship, in 
fact, far antedates Roman Imperial law. In the oration of Demos-
thenes against Dionysodorus, in the Athenian courts, we have an 
action on a bottomry loan made to the masters of a vessel as agents 
of the Governor of Egypt, both cargo and ship doubtless belonging 
to the Egyptian State. Vessels encargoed for the account of the 
Roman Government are frequently referred to in Justinian. Their 
status is closely analagous to that of the requisitioned ship. Numer-
ous laws appear regulative of their voyages, 1 extending immunities 
to their owners, masters, and mariners,2 fixing their responsibility 
with respect to transportation, imposts and deliveries,3 penalizing 
illegal traffic in commodities transported for the state, and forbid-
1 The Code, Lib. XI, tit. 1, frag. 8; Lib. XI, tit. 5, frag. 3. 
2 Lib. XI, tit. I. 
3 Lib. XI, tit. I, frag. 4, 5, 6, 7. 
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ding deviations. Apparently the entire merchant marine of Rome 
was subject to government requisition whenever and wherever pub-
lic need demanded it. The law imposed heavy penalties, including 
often confiscation of the ship, for evasions of this duty of the ship 
owner toward the state. Displacement fixed the class of vessels 
liable to requisition and no excuse, proprietary privilege, or even 
imperial sanction availed to exempt the ship owner. All the ships 
on the Tiber were equally liable to government use. So exclusive 
was the right of the state, that those who placed their merchandise 
aboard vessels already encargoed for the government, not only 
incurred severe punishment, but became liable for the perils of 
the sea. 
. The real value of this historical aspect of the question, as it is 
presented to British and American courts of Admiralty, is apparent 
when it is observed that linder the administrative law of Imperial 
Rome the greater part of state properties was submitted to both 
the rules and procedure of the civil law. Fiscal properties were 
distinguished from communal, and both of these from the private 
domain of the Emperor, in whom the title to public property extra--
commercittm appears to have vested ;4 but even the private domain 
of the Emperor was subject to all legal measures known to the 
civil law of Rome incident to the acquisition, alienation of, and 
acquiring· of security in property. Excluded from that part, ex.tra-
commerciitm of the patrimonio romani popiili or patrimonial prop-
erty of the Roman state, the properties controlled by the Imperial 
"Fisc" such as mines, forests, etc., while administered largely by 
Imperial rescripts, were subject to all the obligations imposed by 
the municipal law of Rome. It was not different in the realm of 
maritime affairs. The property, movable and immovable, of ship-
owners, masters, and mariners in Roman law was subjected by vir-
tue of Imperial rescripts to the obligation of liens to secure the 
performance of contracts of affreightment with private parties, and 
these measures probably extended to bottomry hypothecations. It 
is significant that these liens given by Imperial law were in rem 
and attached to all property of mariners, though in the hands of 
innocent purchasers, and survived until perfect satisfaction of the 
obligation first incurred, ~ven though it happens, says the law, ''tbat 
4 Lib. XI, tit. 70. 
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such property comes into our (the Imperial) patrimony."u It is 
therefore clear that in Roman law the personal contractual obliga-
tions of ship-~wners, etc., gave rise to rights in rem which were 
not extinguished by the property so invested with a lien coming 
into the ownership of the Emperor or state. "The charge is in the 
thing and not on the person," says the rescript, the lien only being 
divested if the property ceases to be alienable and is subordinated 
to some purpose, e.~tra-comniercium. No evasion of the pecuniary 
responsibility of mariners for the safe transport of government ~ar­
goes is countenanced by Roman law, which rule affords further 
evidence that vessels requisitioned by the Roman state did not by 
reason of that alone enjoy any exemption from liability in rem. 
In view of the fact that Roman law gave a lien in favor of the 
shipper enforceable against the ship or other property of its owner, 
though the same had come not only into the possession but into 
the ownership of the Roman state or its Imperial representative, · 
and of the further fact that this right arose out of contractual obli-
gation and affected property_!n coninierciuni with respect to which 
even Imperial Rome could set up no defense of immunity from 
suit, the continental system as exemplified in the modern practice 
of France is thoroughly understandable. In general, the- requisition 
of a merchant vessel, say French authorities, does not alter owner-
ship, but temporarily suppresses its enjoyment.0 The indeterminate 
character of the state's obligation to the ship-owner and the recipro-
cal rights, duties, and liabilities of the latter with regard not only 
to the state but third parties have ultimated in the adoption-of uni-
form types of charter-parties and contracts of carriage and of hire. 
The general requisition in 1918 of the French merchant marine 
was characterized by the assumption by the state of the liabilities 
of an insurer, both with respect to marine and war risks, and the 
submission of all controversies arising under the charter-party to 
the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. Contracts relative to 
the commercial exploitation under private management of French 
vessels, or those formerly of enemy ownership, or, again, of neu-
tral or allied ships under requisition to and laden for the account 
of the French government, uniformly refer jurisdiction to the cog-
u Lib. XI, tit. 2. 
6 Collin, Situation de l'annament maritime en France, 1914-19. 
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nizance of the administrative courts and make no exception, because 
of sovereignty, with respect to the justiciable character of suits 
-respecting shipping so affected to public use or belonging to the 
state. The jurisdiction of the administrative courts in France, as 
compared with courts having1 regard to the civil relations of citizens 
inter se, is characterized by essential differences in the legal prin-
ciples applied governing the relations of the individual and the state. 
The relation of the administrative courts to the judicial is compar-
able to that which equity bears to the common law in Anglo-i\mer-
ican law. There is no analogy between the French administrative 
system and the constitutional relations between American govern-
mental authorities and citizens, nor to the functions and powers of 
the Crown and its servants in England which must be exercised in 
accordance with those ordinary common law principles governing 
the relations of one subject to another. In France the rights of 
parties under public law depend upon administrative acts whose 
interpretation results necessarily to the administrative courts. Acts 
of executive power constituting so-called actes de gouvernement 
may be limited to a very restricted class outside of which no admin-
istrative act could properly be regarded as an act of the state draw-
ing to it immunities in favor of sovereignty; or, in the opinion of 
other writers, any executive act united with a political aim (inspire 
par 1tn mobile politiqiee) may be treated as an act of state which 
lies outside the jurisdiction of any court whatever.7 With these 
general considerations in mind, it is apparent that the interven-
tion of the state in maritime affairs creates a very important 
branch of French maritime law as well as a most varied control of 
shipping, private and public. It exhibits some incongruity in the 
survival of very ancient rules. As a distinct branch of French mari-
time law it remains unqualified, except for some general compila-
tions of the older regulations and modern ordinances, rules, and 
statutory enactments. French maritime law itself, while theoret-
ically comprehending the totality of juridicial relations between pri-
vate persons engaged in maritime transport, is divisible between 
the civil and commercial jurisdictions, the greater part, relative to 
7 Compare Laferriere, Traite de la Juridiction Administrative, II, Lib. 
IV, ch. 2, p. 32, and Hauriou, Precis· de Droit Administrative, pp. 282-7, with 
Jacquelin, La Juridictio11: Administrative, pp. 438-17. 
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the ownership of vessels and their transmission being purely civil 
law; nor is the maritime law of France a mere accessory of the 
commercial law. That part destined to be regulative of the rela-
tions of purely private law bears the unmistakable imprint of the 
administrative regulations and rules of public law. 
These salient distinctions are seen in French law and judicial 
opinion relative to merchant vessels owned or requisitioned by the 
state. It is apparent from an examination of the extensive legisla-
tion in France controlling the French merchant marine and its 
requisition by the state during the late war, together with decisions 
relative thereto, that French jurisprudence has not regarded the 
participation of the state in maritime affairs as conferring any 
immunity in respect of civil obligations, but in full appreciation of 
the justiciable character of the controversies which have arisen has 
submitted them to the ordinary municipal law of France, though 
cognizance has been restricted to the administrative tribunals. 
While the state in the event of a collision between a private ship and 
a war vessel must bring its claim in the judicial courts, the victim 
of the collision must cite the state before the Conseil d'Etat, appeal 
lying from a decision of the Ministry of Marine refusing indemnity.8 
The administrative tribunals are equally competent when the ship 
is affected to public uses of the state. 9 
As a general principle of French law, the French courts are 
incompetent to take jurisdiction of controversies between foreigners 
not domiciled in France respecting either personal rights or movable 
property. In a recent decision10 the ship Kolaos, which it was 
alleged by the government of Greece had been fraudulently sold to 
an Italian, armed, and placed in the government service of Italy, 
and which it was the purpose of the Greek government to requisi-
8 Trib. des Conflits, Jan. 17, 1874, D. 74, 3, 4; Com: d'Etat, May II, 1870, 
D. 71, 3, 57; Feb. 15, 1872, D. 73, 3, 57; April 15, 1873, D. 73, 3, 58; July 22, 
1899, Clunet, 1894. p. 813; March 19, 1897, Revue internationale de droit 
maritime, XXII, 663; March 16, 1900, ibid., XVIII, 142, D., 1901, 3, 57, S., 
1!)02, 3, 64. 
o Trib. des Conflits, July 6, 1912, R I. D. M., XXVIII, 530. See also 
Ripert, Droit maritime, XI, 529, par. 1926. 
io The Government of Greece v. The Government of Italy; Ambatielos 
and Societe Nationale de Navigations de Genoa, Cour d'Appel de Bordeaux, 
Dec. 4, 1917. 
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tion, was arrested in the Port of Bordeaux. The French court 
refused to take jurisdiction of this litigation between the Italian 
and Greek governments since to do so would have involved them in 
the regulation of international relations. Incompetency was asserted 
ratione niateria, since adjudication would have necessitated the con-
struction of both foreign law and diplomatic conventions and con-
sequently the international public law of the contending govern-
ments, each of whicl). relied upon its sovereign rights which the 
French court affirmed were above ordinary judicial process. It is, 
however, notable that the decision condemned the Greek govern-
ment to the payment of an amend and all the expenses of the appeal 
and previous trials. Both governments were en presence and there 
appears to have been no refusal to appear emanating from diplo-
matic sources nor plea to the jurisdiction. It is further noteworthy 
that whereas the conservatory measures demanded by the Greek 
government to secure the requisitioning of the vessel were refused, 
nevertheless the vessel throughout this prolonged litigation was 
detained in port as a result of saisie conservatoire authorized by 
the administrative tribunal. It was the substantial holding of the 
court that further sequestration of the vessel would be in exercise 
of an unauthorized jurisdiction. Two facts regarding the French 
law of saisie conservatoire are of importance in this connection: the 
arrest of a vessel under French law does not confer jurisdiction 
upon the commercial court,11 nor does the jurisdiction of such court 
arise from the maritime lien which would justify in Anglo-American 
practice a libel in reni. What in effect occurred in this important 
decision was a refusal on the part of the judicial authorities to con-
cede an executory title in favor of the Greek government. A defect 
of jurisdiction being involved, the validity of the arrest was con-
tested, a question with respect to which the tribunals of commerce 
are not competent to adjudicate but which must come before the 
appropriate civil tribunal. The Cour de Cassation has so held many 
times.12 The case did not involve a vessel requisitioned or owned 
by the government of France and consequently its adjudication was 
11 Cour d' Appel de Rouen, May IS, r9r8, R. D. I. M., XXXI. 
12 Cass., Aug. 22, r882, D. 83, I', 214; Cass., Nov. II, 1885, D. 86, l, 68; 
Tunis, Feb. 2r, r88g, R. I. D. M., V, r30; Oct. 5, r8g3, ibid., IX, 84; Havre, 
Oct. r6, r894, ibid., X, 439. 
REQUISITIONED SHIPS 
not a matter of exclusive jurisdiction in the administrative courts. 
The Tribunal Civile de Bordeaux has held very recently13 that a 
vessel belonging to the American government, though under charter 
to private parties, enjoyed an immunity from _attachment ( saisie 
arret) which extended to its papers. These it appears had been 
attached by order of customs and port authorities. The principle 
asserted by the court of the immunity of vessels belonging to for-
eign governments as being of universal recognition cannot be 
admitted. Continental jurisprudence is divided on the general ques-
tion of the saisissabilite of the property of a foreign sovereign or 
state. France, Belgium, and Germany, like .England, take a position 
contrary to that of Italy. For the immunity claimed, we find Foelix, 
Rolin-J acquemyns, Bomans, Bynkershoek, Westlake, Field, Droop, 
Cuvelier, Laurent, Holtzendorff, Carre-Chaveau, Dalloz, Frazier-
Herman, Lawrence, Aubrey, Rau, Pradier-Fodere, Chavegrin, Vat-
tel, Chretien, Fiore, Heffter, Demolombe. In favor of the compe-
tency are Von Bar, Calvo, Kliiber, De Paepe, Demangeat, Von Mar-
tens, Bonfils, Legat, Despagnet, Piedelievre, Spee, Gabba, Philli-
more, Bluntschli, Weiss, Gianzana, Von Heyking, and Giliespie. 
It is -probable that Lawrence and Fiore would admit the exception 
to the general rule of immunity where the property is destined to 
use in commercium, very clearly-recognized by Gabba and Von Bar. 
While the Bordeaux decision turned upon the destination of the 
attached property to public use or service and is founded upon a 
number of preceding decisions, it is very significant that the court, 
referring to the learned dissertation of Professor Gabba of the 
University of Pisa, 14 comments favorably upon his distinction 
between acts of commerce and of government exercised by the state, 
admitting the arrest of vessels belonging to foreign governments 
where such are engaged in ordinary commerce. "It seems in effect 
equitable to assimilate the state acting as an individual to the indi-
vidual himself." 
A distinction however may be observed between saisie conserva-
toire and saisie arret. The latter is civil in character and predicated 
upon an execution-title in him who seeks to effect the arrest. The 
general rule is that vessels which are not the subject of private prop-
13 April 27, 1920. 
14 Clunet, 18go, p. 41. 
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erty or those which are affected to a public use cannot be seized in 
execution of judgments.15 It is not to be inferred, however, that 
provisional arrest, the saisie conservatoire, is not effective or sanc-
tioned by French l_aw and practice against requisitioned and gov-
ernment-owned vessels. In fact, it is specifically allowed for French 
vessels under the law of April ro, r9o6, Arts. r, 7. In France the 
law does not provide for seizure and execution against foreign-
owned vessels, but notification is made to the consul of the nation 
to which the vessel belongs under the authority of the consular 
convention. Saisie conservatoire, in ordinary cases, is available to 
creditors of the shipowners independently of their civil right in 
personam. It is consequential to their droit de suite which is a 
right, perhaps not co-extensive with the Anglo-American maritime 
lien, but independent of possession and good against all the world. 
In effect it may be concluded that the virtual libel of government-
owned and requisitioned vessels whether French or foreign is not 
outside the power of French commercial courts or other maritime 
authorities, judicial or administrative. If, as held in The Kongsli,16 
saisie conservatoire is not to be assimilated to an action in rem but 
to a personal action, and if British and American decisions, however 
rightly, attribute the character of suits in personam to civil actions 
in France terminating in the saisie-execution of the ship and its 
sale,17 the distinction becomes vital between seizure for purposes of 
execution sale in French law, comparable to sale by sheriff under a 
fieri facias at common law, and the provisional arrest and detention 
of a vessel under the French saisie conservatoire. The latter is 
essentially the vindication of a property right in the vessel. Its rec-
ognition as such by American courts is an essential and necessary 
step in the determination of the question whether the property in 
commercium of a state may be subjected to process in admiralty. 
In Continental law it must also be borne in mind that this is an 
administrative rather than a judicial act. In Italy, at least, the 
complementary action of the executive power is no less assured 
15 Ripert, Vol. I, par. 892; Mittelstein, De la saisissabilite ou de l'insaisis-
sabilite des navires, R. I. D. M., IX, 91, 648; X, 364; Guilibert, De l'insaisis-
sabilite des navires affectes a un service postal, Clunet, 1885, pp. 515, Aix, 
Aug. 3, 1885, Clunet, 1885, p. 554-
16 252 Fed. 367. 
17 Castrique v. Imbrie, L. R. 4 H. L. 414 (1870). 
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than if the judge were invested with both jurisdictio and imperimn, 
the administrative authorities not being able to dispense with the 
duty to conform to civil judgments against the state.18 
The courts of Italy have gone far in deciding "that when a gov-
ernment binds itself by contract of a private _character, it can be 
summoned by the creditor in any foreign court where such an one 
resides."19 This decision proceeded on the theory that an action 
against a foreign state might be entertained, ratione niateria, if the 
foundation of the action were such as pertains to the ordinary 
administration of the state in which the foreign government has not 
acted jure imperii but jure gestionis. Foreign states or sovereigns 
conducting economic or commercial activities in Italy are amenable 
to the municipal law thereof and subject, not only to the jurisdic-
tion of its courts, but to the execution of judgments. As a general 
rule, in so far as the property of the continental nation is alienable 
in character and destined to commercial use, it is subject to the rule 
of municipal law as other private property. The performance of 
cotn!lJercial acts by the state does not confer upon a government 
the character of a merchant, but leads, however, to the usual conse-
quences resultant upon commercial transactions. French jurispru-
dence very uniformly refers adjudication in respect of acts of com-
merce effected by the state or its officers, or liability incurred by its 
vessels under French maritime law, to the administrative tribunals 
upon principles of common law as well as the special rules of admin-
istrative law.20 
British law is averse to the arrest of King'~ ships, or vessels 
belonging to civil departments of the British governme~t, as well 
as those in government service belonging to private owners, and 
extends like immunity to vessels which are the public property of 
foreign states, though engaged in trade, since they are destined to 
public use. However, British law permits suits in personam against 
18 See Gabba, Clunet, 1888, p. 180; 1889, p. 538; 1890, p. 27. 
19 Cour de Gand, March 14, 1879, J. VIII, p. 82, March 22, 1887, J. XV, 
p. 289. 
20 See the Navire Dalemoor, Cour de Commerce de Marseille, Aug. IO, 
1915, R. I. D. M., XXX, 372; Navires Jean Bart, Phoceen, Girelle, Trib. de 
Com. de Marseille (requisitioned ship, action against the state), June 29, 
1915, R. I. D. M. XXX, 367. 
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the postmaster and other respol.Jsible officials, and while the Lords 
Commissioners of the Admiralty cannot be called upon by the own-
ers of merchants to answer in a suit for damages they usually 
instruct their solicitor to defend.21 While the same rule of immunity 
from arrest avails in respect of vessels employed mainly or wholly 
for public purposes, such as vessels of war, in the case of a requi-
sitioned ship where the possession of the government was merely 
temporary the warrant was set aside but it was stated that an 
action could be brought against the owners. In other_ words, a 
writ could be issued.22 Thus it is apparent that while the ship of a 
sovereign power is not under the British law liable in an action in 
rem, and all proceedings can be set aside,23 the British admiralty 
court is not incompetent to give relief. It will indeed take juris-
diction so far as to arbitrate where the foreign sovereign consents. 
It seems obvious that it is judgment in rem, good against all the 
world under both American and British systems, which the British 
courts decline to pronounce for the reason that it would be incom-
patible with the position and dignity of the foreign sovereign to 
enforce such a judgment against his property. · 
In determining the public status of a vessel which will draw to 
itself the immunity accorded the property of a sovereign, a little 
considered but really very important element is the question of the 
assumption of risk of sea-damage and other injury. Thus, a vessel 
under charter to the Crown and used as a transport, but not demised, 
all risk of sea-damage being at the risk of the owners, was held not 
to be a ship of the Crown.24 More recently, requisition by the Admi-
ralty of a tug whose owners incurred the marine risks was held not 
to preclude their claim for salvage which would have been denied 
had the Crown been the owner. Under the uniform type of charter 
party adopted in France relative to the general requisition of its 
shipping, the French government assumed all risks, an act consistent 
with the necessities of the war, but in no way ousting the jurisdic- _ 
tion of the administrative tribunals. In other words, the assump-
tion of risk, be it war or marine, bears an important relation to the 
21 See Roscoe, Admiralty Practice, 4th ed., pp. 97 et seq. 
22 The Broadmayne, [1916] P. 64 
2 3 The Parlement Belge, L. R. 5 P. D. 197 (188o). 
24 The Nile, L. R. 4 A. & E. 449 (1875). 
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liability of the government which should not be overlooked in fix-
ing responsibility and in determining competency. 
In Long v. The Tanipico,25 the American rule as to the immunity 
of property of the federal government from process was extended 
in the federal courts to the property of foreign governments, though 
the immunity granted by such foreign governments in their mvn 
courts depends upon the public use to which the property is appro-
priated. Actual and not mere constructive possession of the United 
States constitutes the basis of the immunity of its property from the 
process of its courts. This idea is traceable to the decisions in The 
Siren26 and The Davis.21 But the opinion in the latter case was 
directly qualified, if not reversed, by the decision of the Supreme 
Court in United Staites v. Lee,28 where it was said: "This exam-
ination of the cases in this court establishes clearly this result; that 
the proposition that when an individual is sued in regard to prop-
erty which he holds as officer or agent of the United States, his pos-
session cannot be disturbed, when that fact is brought to the atten-
tion of the Court, has been overruled and denied in every case 
where it was necessary to decide it."29 The distinction here was 
between a direct suit against the United States and a suit against 
persons asserting to hold under authority of and as officers of the 
United States. According to the decision in The Davis, "the prop-
erty of the United States may be dealt with by subjecting it to a 
·maritime lien where this can be done without making the United 
States a party." In Workman v. New York City3° the Supreme 
Court held that the immunity of the sovereign from suit in his own 
court or of a foreign sovereign, by reason of international comity, 
liability being admitted, rests alone on inability to give redress 
where jurisdiction over the person or property cannot be exerted. 
As interpreted recently by the Supreme Court of the United States,31 
Workman v. New York City is declared to have "dealt with a ques-
tion of the substantive law of Admiralty, not the power to exercise 
2s 76 Fed. Cas. 491. 
!!6 7 Wall. 152. 
27 IO Wall. 15. 
2s lo6 U. S. 196. 
29 106 U. S. lg6, 215-16. 
so 179 u. s. 552. 
a1 No. 25, Original, Oct. Term, 1920. 
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jurisdiction over the person of defendant," and it is said that "in 
the opinion the Court was careful to distinguish between the 
immunity from jurisdiction attributable to a sovereign upon 
grounds of policy, and immunity from liability in a particular case." 
"Sovereignty does not necessarily imply an exemption of its prop-
erty from judicial process and jurisdiction of the courts of justice; 
* * * it seems a fair inference from the duties of the sovereign in 
such cases that where a lien exists on property upon general prin-
ciples of justice jure gentium that lien ought to be presumed to be 
admitted and protected by every sovereign until the presumption 
is repelled by some positive edict to the contrary."32 Chief Justice 
Marshall was of opinion that "when a government becomes a part-
ner in any trading company it divests itself so far as it concerns 
the transactions of that company of its sovereign character and 
takes that of a private citizen."33 
It is apparent that immunity of the property of a foreign sover-
eign from suit rests upon principles of international comity, though 
the rule respecting the possession of the government which obtains 
in cases where the United States is party defendant has been 
extended to cases involving the vessels of a foreign sovereign. It 
is believed that the judicial power of the federal courts in admiralty 
to limit their jurisdiction because of international comity is always 
constrained by their obligation to protect and enforce the consti-
tutional rights of citizens of the United States, as well as those 
entitled to the protection of the United States, including all such 
vested rights of property as arise under the general maritime law 
and constitute rights in rem or maritime liens. In the case of The 
Pesaro,84 the Supreme Court of the United States has said: "By 
the Judicial Code, sec. 24, cl. 3, the District courts are invested with 
original jurisdiction of 'all civil causes of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction' ; and this is a suit of that character. Whether Con-
gress intended this statute should include sitits against ships such 
as the Pesaro is represented to be in the Ambassador's suggestion, 
when they are within the waters of the United States, is as y,et an 
open question. The statute contains no express exception of them; 
32 Story, J., in United States v. Wilder, 3 Sumner 307, 317. 
33 Bank of the United States v. The Planters Bank, 9 Wheat. 904, 907. 
34 255 u. s. 216. 
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but it may be that they are impliedly excepted. The Exchange, 7 
Cranch n6, 136, 146. If so, the implication is a part of the statute. 
United States v. Babbit, l Black. 55, 6I ; South Carolina v. United 
States, 199 U. S. 437, 45I." This was the case of a steamer owned 
by the Government of Italy, libelled in rem for damage to cargo. 
In its earlier decision in Re Muir,35 the Supreme Court admitted 
that it would "be taking a long step" to apply the doctrine of The 
Exchange to the question of immunity from arrest of the vessel in 
that case, the vessel being under requisition to a foreign govern-
ment. The nature and extent of governmental service and control 
would, if inferences are to be drawn from this opinion, constitute 
important elements in such decision and the conclusion would be 
unavoidable that jurisdiction in both cases must tum upon the status 
of the vessel as destined to commercial use rather than some agency 
essentially governmental in purpose. In this latter decision the 
Supreme Court held that it will regard the public law of the foreign 
country in respect to the right of its accredited representative to 
intervene in admiralty suits in the courts of the United States. It 
would seem therefore that it should further give weight in its deci-
sion to the administrative law of such foreign country by virtue of 
which suits concerning its vessels, whether of war or of commerce, 
are submitted to administrative tribunals. Further, where the lien 
asserted arises by reason of foreign contract or foreign delict, it 
would seem that the lez locus enters fundamentally into the solu-
tion of this question of the immunity of requisitioned or govern-
ment-owned merchant ships of a foreign sovereign. 
The question whether by international law the rule of The 
Exchange is to be applied to other kinds of public vessels owned 
or controlled by friendly powers was not decided in The Queen 
City,3a but the Court there relied on the principle exempting the 
property of municipal corporations employed for public and gov-
ernmental purposes from seizure by admiralty process in rent, hold-
ing that it applied with even greater force to exempt public prop-
erty of a state used and employed for public and governmental pur-
poses. The decision turned on a rule, not of international law but 
-0f municipal law, that the machinery of government must be held 
36 254 U. S. 522. 
36 No. 26, Original, Oct. Term, 1920. 
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exempt from seizure and sale under process against a municipality 
or state. The question whether a suit in admiralty brought by pri-
vate parties through a process in rem against property of a state is 
not in effect a suit against the state remains open. The Supreme 
Court had earlier declared the immunity of a state from suit in 
personam in admiralty, brought by a private person without its 
consent, to be clear; that in a suit against a state by individuals, 
whether its own citizens or not, the admiralty and maritime juris-
diction is not excepted from the operation of the rule that a state 
may not be sued without its consent. In the case of In re Hussein 
Lutfi Bey, Master of the Gul Djemal,31 the question whether the 
ship of a foreign government used and operated as a merchant ves· 
sel is, when within the waters of the United States, immune from 
process in rem was thought debatable. The Court significantly com-
mented~ "It is not plain that there is an absence of jurisdiction." 
The Act of Congress of March 9, 1920, authorizing actions in 
personam against the United States in admiralty suits for salvage 
services, in the light of the foregoing recent decisions, fails to 
observe the distinction toward which the Supreme Court very obvi-
ously inclines. The statute grants a right in personam in the fed-
eral court, with the proviso that in view thereof the vessel shall not 
be subject to arrest or seizure by judicial process of the United 
States. Should the Supreme Court hold ultimately -that the prop·· 
erty or vessels of a state engaged in commerce are subject to mari-
time liens and may be proceeded against in rem, it is apparent that 
the Act of Congress must fall in this particular, since it would 
operate to alter the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. In pro-
viding for the release upon stipulation of cargoes or vessels from 
arrest and attachment in foreign ports, in the same Act, Congress 
has tacitly admitted a possible jurisdictional power which appears 
to go farther than continental decisions indicate and include saisie 
arret of vessels owned, in the possession of, or operated by the 
United States. This provision includes a reservation that no claim 
to immunity of such vessel or cargo from foreign arrest shall be fore-
closed or otherwise prejudiced in a proper case. But it follows that 
a like exemption should arise upon principles of comity in favor of 
foreign government-owned vessels under libel in the United States; 
37 Oct Term, I920. 
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and it thus becomes essential to detennine, whether the indicated 
attitude qf the Supreme Court, should it crystallize in decision 
affirming the jurisdiction of the federal courts to entertain suits in. 
rem against the property of the United States or of foreign sover-
eigns, will not make such reservation quite inoperative. The test 
in all these cases, whether the vessel be under requisition or other-
wise in the ownership or possession and operation of government, 
is the use of the ship or the destination of the property to commer-
cial uses rather than the ends of state. That this distinction pre-
sents difficulty in itself is patent. How \Vlll one differentiate strictly 
when the revenues of the state and so the agencies of government 
may be vitally affected by the profits from the government's com-
mercial enterprises? 
New York Cit'j•. · J. WHITLA STINSON. 
